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Abstract
I explore the effect of skill-biased technological change and unbiased technological progress on long-
run inequality using a theoretical model in which the supply of skilled and unskilled workers is
endogenous. The main assumption of the model is that young agents can finance their education
and become skilled workers by borrowing against their future income on an imperfect credit mar-
ket. I show that whenever the rate of unbiased technological progress is sufficiently high there is
no steady-state inequality, independently on the degree of skill bias. If instead the rate of unbiased
technological progress is low, then the long-run skill premium increases with the technological skill
bias. Therefore, similarly to the short run, in the long run higher technological skill bias may
cause higher inequality. However, contrary to the short run, in the long run unbiased technological
progress is more important than technological skill bias in determining inequality. I also discuss how
the efficiency of the educational technology and the degree of financial development affect long-run
inequality.
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The evolution of the wage structure in the United States between the end of the 1970s
and the beginning of the 1990s suggests that technology can increase short-run inequality.
Following the introduction of the personal computer and the unfolding of the information
technology era, the difference between the average wage of workers with a college degree and
of workers with a high-school degree increased significantly. This wave of innovations was
skill biased : it increased the productivity of skilled workers (workers with a college degree),
leaving unchanged the productivity of unskilled workers.1
However, the long-run impact of technology on inequality is not well understood. The
reason is that, in the long run, the supply of skilled workers may react to variations in wages.
For example, parents may be willing to spend more on the education of their children when
the return on education is higher. In addition, the short-run cost of education is fixed, but
the long-run college tuitions are likely to be correlated with the skilled wage because college
professors are skilled workers. Finally, a sufficiently well-developed financial system may
allow students to borrow against their future income. When this income is higher, more
people should be able to borrow and access education.
The goal of this paper is to explore theoretically the effect of technology on long-run
inequality, by building an overlapping generation model in which the demand and, most
importantly, the supply of different types of skills is endogenous. In the model, parents
care about the future earnings of their offspring, and leave bequests that are used by young
adults to access education either directly or by first borrowing on the credit market. In
addition, the cost of education is endogenous and is proportional to the wage of skilled
workers. Regarding the demand for skills, the model is fairly standard, in the sense that a
competitive production sector pays workers their marginal product.
The central assumption of the model is that credit market is imperfect. Young agents
can borrow against their future income. However, because of credit market frictions, only
agents with a sufficient level of inherited wealth can access the credit market. It follows that
changes in the wage structure affect the number of people who can access the credit market
both directly via the credit market, and indirectly via the equilibrium level of bequests left
by parents.
In the model, the degree of altruism of each parent is stochastic, so that there is always a
positive probability that an unskilled parent has a skilled child (and vice versa). Nonetheless,
if skilled and unskilled parents earn different amounts (i.e. there is inequality), the cost
of leaving sufficient bequests so that a child can access education will be higher for an
unskilled parent than for a skilled parent. The reason is that, in terms of forgone utility
1 For empirical evidence, see, among many others, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2005), and Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998).
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from consumption, the cost of educating a child is higher for poor parents than for rich
parents. This observation implies that inequality is possible in steady state, because the
higher is the difference in earnings between skilled and unskilled workers, the lower is social
mobility, which in turn implies that skilled workers may be scarce and earn a wage premium
over unskilled workers.
The above reasoning fails—and inequality is not possible in steady state—whenever all
young individuals can borrow on the credit market and finance their education, indepen-
dently on the inheritance received. Hence, steady-state inequality can exist only if credit
rationing exists, so that only agents born with wealth above a certain threshold can be-
come skilled workers. The main result of the paper is to show that the existence of credit
rationing depends on the level of development of the financial sector, on the efficiency of
the educational sector, and on the unbiased growth rate of the economy. Crucially, skill-
biased technological change plays no role in the existence of credit rationing. In this sense,
whereas the unbiased growth rate of the economy can be considered a first-order deter-
minant of long-run inequality, skill-biased technological change is, at best, a second-order
determinant.
Intuitively, the effect of an increase in skill bias on the functioning of the credit market
has two components. Higher skill bias increases both the cost of education, and the future
skilled wage, which can be used as collateral in the credit market. When the efficiency of
the schooling technology (which determines the cost of education), the development of the
financial sector (which determines the presence of credit market frictions) and the growth
rate of the economy (which determines the future skilled wage) are high enough, the positive
effect always dominates. As a consequence, for any level of skill bias a young agent who is
born with zero wealth can access the credit market and become a skilled worker, because
the future wage itself provides enough collateral to access the credit market. The converse is
also true, because if a young agent who is born with no wealth can access the credit market
for some level of skill bias, then this agent can access the credit market for any level of skill
bias.
If credit market rationing is present because, for example, the growth rate of the economy
is low, then higher technological skill bias increases long-run inequality. A higher skill bias
increases the likelihood that the steady state of the economy is unequal, and increases the
steady-state skill premium if the steady state is unequal. Intuitively, the cost of leaving
bequests large enough so that a child can access education is always greater for an unskilled
parent than for a skilled parent, the more so the higher is the skill bias. Hence, higher skill
bias decreases intergenerational mobility. This effect, coupled with an increase in the skill
premium, generates higher long-run inequality following an increase in the skill bias.
The same framework can be applied to understanding the long-run effects of other tech-
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nological and policy changes. For example, the efficiency of the educational technology is a
first-order determinant of long-run inequality, in the sense that when it is sufficiently high
there is no inequality in steady state. Furthermore, in case steady-state inequality exists,
an increase in the efficiency of the educational technology decreases the level of steady-state
inequality. Therefore, the model suggests that innovation in the educational sector (i.e. the
introduction of online learning or MOOC) should decrease long-run inequality, possibly to
the point of bringing the economy to the equal steady state. An increase in the efficiency of
the financial system delivers similar predictions; a more developed financial system decreases
(and potentially eliminates) steady-state inequality. In addition, the effect of an improve-
ment in the functioning of the financial system on long-run inequality is larger whenever
the technological skill bias is large.
Relevant Literature
Within the economic literature, there is a growing recognition that the evolution of inequality
should be studied by looking at variations of both the supply and the demand for skills.
Piketty (2006) nicely summarizes:
[...] the impact of technology on inequality depends on a large number of
institutions, and these institutions vary a great deal over time and across coun-
tries. Chief among these are the institutions governing the supply and structure
of skills, from formal schooling institutions to on-the-job training schemes. To
a large extent, the dynamics of labor market inequality are determined by the
race between the demand for skills and the supply of skills. New technologies
tend to raise the demand for skills, but the impact on inequality depends as to
whether the supply of skills is rising at a faster or lower rate. There is no general
presumption that the race should go one way or the other.
Formally, my paper belongs to the literature on long-run wealth distribution started by
Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993), who show that non-convexities
in investment opportunities may generate permanent inequality.2 Within this literature,
my model is closely related to Mookherjee and Ray (2010). As in their model, I assume
that agents care about their offspring’s wealth (paternalistic altruism), and that wages
are determined endogenously. However, contrary to Mookherjee and Ray (2010), in my
model the cost of education and the existence of credit rationing are also endogenous.
This difference is important because the cost of education and credit rationing are the
channels through which technology affects the access to different professions and determines
2 See also Piketty (1997); Matsuyama (2000); Mookherjee and Ray (2003); Mookherjee, Prina, and Ray
(2012).
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the supply of different types of skills. Also, similarly to Mookherjee and Napel (2007),
the presence of shocks (in my case, to a parent’s altruism, in their case to innate ability)
generates steady states that are locally unique, which is relevant whenever the goal is to
perform steady-state comparative-static analysis. Within this literature, Rigolini (2004) also
considers a model derived from Mookherjee and Ray (2010) in which the cost of education is
endogenous but agents are exogenously prevented from borrowing. He shows that, depending
on the parameters of the utility function, the unbiased growth rate of the economy may
increase or decrease the incentive for unskilled workers to acquire education. He also argues
that the same result holds also with respect to skill-biased technological change.
Here I derive results that are substantially different from Rigolini’s. In my model, if the
unbiased growth rate of the economy is high enough there will be no long-run inequality,
independently of the shape of the utility function. The reason is that, contrary to Rigolini’s,
here agents can borrow for education on an imperfect credit market, and the functioning of
the credit market is affected by the growth rate of the economy. Furthermore, I show that
an increase in the technological skill bias leads to higher long-run inequality. This result
contradicts Rigolini’s intuition, and is due to the fact that technological skill bias affects
differentially the relative cost of education of skilled and unskilled agents. In steady state,
an increase in the productivity of skilled workers increases the wage of skilled workers and
the cost of education, leaving unchanged the wage of unskilled workers. As a consequence,
following an episode of skill-biased technological change, skilled and unskilled parents’ in-
centive to educate their children change in very different ways.
Finally, a large literature has studied the relationship between technology, occupational
choice and inequality, addressing issues that are related to my paper. Owen and Weil
(1998) show that a faster rate of unbiased technological progress relaxes credit constraints
and reduces inequality, a mechanism that is present in my model too. With respect to this
work, I consider skill-biased technological change and unbiased technological progress at
the same time, and rank these two elements it terms of their impact on long-run inequality.
Eicher (1996) studies the interaction between human capital accumulation and technological
change, and how this interactions affects relative wages and economic growth. Similarly to
my model, he assumes that agents borrow to access education and become skilled workers,
that the cost of education depends on the skilled wage, and that future earnings can be
used as collateral when borrowing. However, in his model every young agent is identical
because there is neither heterogeneity in preferences nor intergenerational wealth transmis-
sion. Hence, by assumption, agents are indifferent between accessing either profession and
there is no inequality. Several authors developed models in which economic inequality is
caused by the interaction technology and heterogeneity in ex-ante ability (Galor and Moav,
2000, Guvenen and Kuruscu, 2012). Here I abstract away from innate ability and focus
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on the intergenerational transmission of wealth as a determinant of an agent’s occupational
choice.
Finally, a number of authors (Kuznets, 1955, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990, Townsend
and Ueda, 2006, Galor and Moav, 2000, and many others) studied the effect of technology
on inequality in the short run, while I’m concerned with the long run. Also, starting with
Acemoglu (1998) a number of papers have argued that the technological skill bias reacts
to the skill composition of the economy. In the body of the paper, instead, I assume that
technology is exogenously given, which is equivalent to assuming that the country under
consideration imports technology from abroad.3 However, in appendix I show that the
results of the model are robust to the introduction of an endogenous skill composition as
long as the elasticity of the technological skill bias to the skill composition of the economy
is not too large.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I illustrate the model. In the third
section, I solve for the steady state of the economy, and derive all the relevant comparative
statics. In the last section, I conclude with a brief summary of the main results and a discus-
sion of their robustness. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs and mathematical derivations
are in appendix.
2 The Model
A small open economy is composed of a measure one of agents, all identical but starting
their lives with different levels of wealth. Each individual is alive for two periods. During
the first period, she receives a bequest from her (only) parent and decides whether to go to
school. Individuals who choose to go to school become skilled types, while those who do not
go to school become unskilled types. During the second period of life, an individual works,
earns a wage, consumes and bequeathes to her (only) child (see Figure 1).
Call wst and wut the wage of a skilled and of an unskilled type working in period t. Call
eit ≥ 0 the bequest made by the member of household i active in period t to the member of
the same household born in period t but active in period t + 1. Call mit+1 the end-of-life
resources of the agent active in period t+ 1, defined as the total resources available to this
agent for consumption and bequests in period t+ 1:
mit+1 =
(eit − ξt)(1 + r) + wst+1 if {i, t} is skilled,eit(1 + r) + wut+1 if {i, t} is unskilled,
where r is an exogenously given interest rate, and ξt is the cost of education in period t
3 See Gancia and Zilibotti (2009), for a model in which an advanced country produces technology according
to its own skill composition, and then exports this technology to other countries.

































































































Fig. 1: Timeline, agent born in period t, active in period t+ 1.
(that will be derived endogenously). The utility function of an agent active in period t is
given by:







where the parameter βit ≥ 0 measures altruism, and is assumed to be an i.i.d. (both over time
and across households) random variable, drawn at the beginning of life from a continuous
distribution defined over [0, β] with β > 0. In other words, agents are altruistic in the
sense they care about the end-of-life resources available to their children, but the degree of
altruism is heterogeneous across generations and households. The functions u() and v() are
assumed increasing and concave.
This form of altruism is called paternalistic altruism.4 It implies that parents care about
their direct offspring but not about distant generations. It can be interpreted as an interme-
diate case between warm-glow altruism and dynastic altruism. Under warm-glow altruism,
parents do not care about their offspring but about the bequests left. Hence, the level of
bequests left does not respond, for example, to an increase in the return on education, which
is a channel I’m interested in exploring and which is present under paternalistic altruism.
Under dynastic altruism each parent cares about all subsequent generations. Bequests re-
spond to an increase in the return on education even when only a remote descendant will
be able to access it, which is a rather unrealistic feature of this form of altruism.5
Young individuals can use the bequests received to finance their education. If these
bequests fall short of the cost of education, they can borrow the difference using their future
wage as collateral. The budget constraint of an individual born in period t − 1 and active
4 See Mookherjee and Ray (2010).
5 Because they generate different incentives to leave financial bequests, different forms of altruism are
more or less likely to generate steady state inequality (see the discussion in Mookherjee and Ray, 2010).
However, here I’m interested in studying how long-run inequality is affected by technology rather than the
conditions for the existence of long-run inequality.
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(1 + r). (2)
However, agents may choose not to repay their loans. In this case, because of limited
liability, when old they will loose only a part of their wealth. Thus, the budget constraint






where τ(.) is a continuous and strictly increasing function, with τ(x) < x for all x. This
function represents the efficiency of the financial sector of the economy, as it determines how
much of an agent’s future income can be pledge as collateral today. In countries with a well
developed system of students’ loans, future income can be easily sized by a lender in case
a loan is not repaid, and therefore τ(x) ≈ 0. In other countries it is very difficult to seize
future income, and therefore τ(x) ≈ x. In Section 3 I will impose a simple parametrization
for the function τ(x) and explore how the ability to pledge future income affects long-run
inequality.







t−1(1 + r). (4)
Given this, banks will lend to agents only if the RHS of 2 is greater than the RHS of 3:
access to the credit market and to school is determined by the bequests received at the
beginning of life. More precisely, people can become skilled types if and only if:
eit−1 ≥ ξt−1 −
(




Although the function τ(.) is taken as given, the existence of credit rationing in the
economy is determined endogenously and depends on wst , and ξt−1. It follows that an
economy with very severe credit constraints in some periods may evolve toward a perfect
credit market in which everybody is able to borrow. Similarly, an economy with a perfect
credit market may later on develop some credit rationing. Because inequality and credit
market imperfections are strictly interconnected, an important part of the analysis that
follows focuses on the long-run evolution of Equation 5.
I will show in Subsection 2.2 that, under fairly weak assumptions, both professions are
always employed in production. This implies that becoming a skilled worker must always
be at least as profitable as becoming an unskilled worker. In other words, in every period
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the RHS of 2 must be greater or equal than the RHS of 4:
wst − (1 + r)ξt−1 ≥ wut . (6)
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where, in both cases, the value of mt+1 depends on whether the bequests et are such that
following generation can access education.
The following lemmas characterize the solution to the above problem.
Lemma 1. Everything else equal, wealthier parents leave larger bequests, i.e., the optimal
eit is weakly increasing in eit−1.
Proof. Since the function u() is concave, then eit and eit−1 are complements in both objective
functions. Hence, by Topkis (1998) Theorem 2.8.1, the optimal eit increases in eit−1.
The above lemma relies on the fact that the marginal utility of own consumption is
decreasing. Hence, everything else equal, as wealth increases, parents consume only part of
the additional resources, and allocate the rest to their offspring.
Lemma 2. Suppose the return on the skilled profession is at least as large as the return
on the unskilled profession. Everything else equal (including wst+1), if τ(wst+1) decreases the
probability of having a skilled child weakly increases.
Proof. It follows from the fact that, for both skilled and unskilled parents, as τ(wst+1)
decreases the bequest level which is necessary to leave so that a child can access education
also decreases. Hence, having a skilled child becomes less costly.
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Hence, everything else equal, if the credit market becomes more efficient, then the thresh-
old required to access education decreases, and each parent becomes more likely to have a
skilled child.
2.1 The Educational Technology.
Call St the number of skilled agents in the economy in period t. In every period, the
educational sector produces skilled agents by hiring teachers Tt ≥ 0 and educational capital




where At is a productivity parameter and is taken as given by the educational sector.
However, due to positive spillovers in human capital accumulation, teacher’s productivity
increases with the number of skilled agents in the economy, so that
At = St.
Because teachers are skilled agents, they must receive the skilled wage, which is deter-
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where c̃t is the market price for educational capital. The above problem has a solution







If the educational capital is supplied inelastically, then there is always an equilibrium
in which c̃t = ξt, and any supply of skilled workers can be an equilibrium supply. Under
this assumption, the equilibrium St+1 is determined on the labor market (see Section 2.3
for more details).
Finally, skilled agents are indifferent between joining the educational sector and working
in the production sector. I assume that this indifference is broken in the following way: each
6 The education capital represents all inputs other than teachers in the production of skilled agents (i.e.,
books, computers, school labs, ...). The fact that educational capital can be negative is simply for ease of
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for ī sufficiently large.
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skilled agent joins the educational sector with probability λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that in every
period the supply of teachers is fixed at λ2St, with the remaining skilled agents employed









= λwst , (7)
which is the same as in Rigolini (2004). That is, the cost of education must be such that
the number of teachers employed is exactly λ2St.
Note that the equilibrium cost of education (7) is weakly increasing in λ. Hence, λ can
also be interpreted as a measure of the efficiency of the educational sector. For given St and
St+1, as the educational technology becomes more efficient (i.e. λ decreases) fewer teachers
are required to train the same amount of skilled workers. As a consequence, the equilibrium
cost of education decreases, leading to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose the return on the skilled profession is at least as large as the return
on the unskilled profession. Everything else equal, if λ decreases the probability of having a
skilled child weakly increases.
Proof. A decrease in λ decreases ξt and causes three effects. First, it increases the return
on education, increasing the benefit of having a skilled child. Second, a decrease in λ makes
education more affordable, in the sense of decreasing the bequest level required to access
education. Third, a decrease in λ makes a skilled parent willing to leave larger bequests.
This last point follows again from Topkis (1998) Theorem 2.8.1, and the fact that λ and
eit are substitutes in a skilled parent objective function. All three effects work in the same
direction and increase the probability of having a skilled child.
The above lemma follows from the fact that as the efficiency of the educational technology
increases, the threshold required to access education decreases. In addition, a more efficient
educational technology increases the return on education, making parents more willing to
finance it, and simultaneously making skilled parents richer and able to finance it.7
7 Note that, in every period, the educational sector generates profits equal to 2λ. For simplicity, I assume
that the educational sector is foreign owned so that these profits do not affect the workings of the economy.
If these profits are equally distributed among all agents in the economy, then everyone’s wealth at the
beginning of life is 2λ + et. In this case, a more efficient educational technology also reduces the profits
earned, and makes people poorer. Modulo this effect, all results derived below continue to hold, but with
different thresholds.
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2.2 The Production Function.












where K is capital, (1−λ2)S and U are skilled and unskilled types employed in production,
and at and bt represent the productivity of the two types of workers. Note that, if both at
and bt change by the same amount, this translates into a change in the overall productivity
of the economy (i.e. a Hicks-neutral productivity increase). Instead, variations to atbt reflect
variations in the skill bias of the economy.






































































so that the wage received by each type of worker in a given period is determined by the
ratio between the number of skilled and unskilled agents employed in production and by
their productivity parameters {at, bt}. Consistent with the literature, the skill premium of













I assume that 0 ≤ ε < 1. When ε < 1 the marginal product of labor at zero is infinity:
no matter how high wages are, firms will always demand a strictly positive amount of each
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type of worker. Furthermore, if ε ≥ 0, for given St and Ut an increase skill bias causes an
increase in the skill premium, which is the relevant empirical case (see the literature on skill-
biased technological change and short-run inequality discussed in the introduction). Finally,
the two types of workers are complements whenever 1 − α > ε, while they are substitutes
whenever 1− α < ε.
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions.
Because the economy can freely borrow and lend on the international capital market, the
domestic market clearing interest rate is equal to the international one, and the capital
market is always in equilibrium. We already argued that the educational sector can supply
any number of skilled workers at ξt, and therefore the educational market is always in
equilibrium. In addition, by Walras’ Law I can ignore the consumption good’s market.
Hence, the economy is in a competitive equilibrium if the two labor markets clear.
The demand for skilled and unskilled workers is given by equations 10 and 11. The
supply depends on whether the returns on the two professions are equal. If all agents prefer
to be skilled, the supply of skilled workers is given by the number of workers whose wealth
satisfies condition 5. If instead agents are indifferent between the two professions, any agent
whose wealth satisfies condition 5 can be either skilled or unskilled. The following definition
formalizes this intuition.
Definition 1. Define Ft−1(e) as the c.d.f of the wealth distribution across the generation
born in period t− 1. For given Ft−1(e) and λ2St−1 (number of teachers available in period
t− 1), a competitive equilibrium in period t is a {Ut, St} that satisfies two conditions:
• Feasibility :
St = 1− Ut, (13)
• Market clearing : if agents strictly prefer being skilled types:









and equations 10 and 11 hold. Alternatively, if agents are indifferent between the two
occupations:
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) = wut , (16)
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and, again, 10 and 11 are satisfied.
Note that, by varying St it is possible to make the return on education either arbitrarily
high or arbitrarily low. For example, if St → 0 there are arbitrary few skilled workers
employed in production in period t, and wst is arbitrarily large. If instead St → 1, the
unskilled wage is arbitrarily large, so education is not profitable. Hence, equations (13)-(17)
always have a unique solution, which imply the following proposition (missing details are in
Appendix).
Proposition 1. A unique competitive equilibrium exists for every Ft−1(e) and St−1.
3 Steady State
Let us assume that the productivity parameters at and bt grow at a common constant rate,





= btbt−1 = γ. It follows that an increase in γ represents an increase
in the rate of unbiased (i.e., Hicks-neutral) technological progress, while an increase in ab
represents an increase in the technological skill bias.
Definition 2. The economy is in a steady state if the fraction of skilled and unskilled
workers is constant over time. A steady state is equal if the returns on the two professions
are equal. A steady state is unequal if the two professions yield different returns.
Call Sss and Uss = 1 − Sss the number of skilled and unskilled agents in steady state,
and note that {Uss, Sss} together with the value of at and bt are sufficient to determine,
in every period, the two wages, the cost of education, and the minimum initial bequests
required to access the credit market. Also, simple algebra shows that, in steady state,










the steady-state skill premium.
Assumption 1. The net return on the skilled profession is positive:
γ > λ(1 + r) (18)
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where the RHS is the cost of education in a steady state, and the LHS is the skilled wage
discounted by one period. This condition implies that the cost of education grows relatively
slowly with the skilled wage, so that an increase in the skilled wage always makes the skilled
profession more attractive. Assumption 1 is necessary to guarantee the existence of a steady
state. Without it, in a sequence of competitive equilibria the number of skilled workers must
shrink over time, so that in every period the skilled wage is greater than the cost of education
and some agents join the skilled profession.
Te remainder of this section proceeds as follows. In order to characterize the steady
state, I first assume that the number of skilled agents in the economy is fixed over time at
an arbitrary level S. This implies that wages grow at rate γ and that the skill premium
is also fixed at η. I show that, for any η there is a unique stationary normalized wealth
distribution (Lemma 4). Finally, I solve for the steady state of the economy by finding the η
generating a wealth distribution such that the number of agents who become skilled in each
period is S (Proposition 2). In general, the economy may have multiple steady states, but
these steady states are locally unique. This allows me to perform some comparative static
analyses.
Distribution of wealth for time-invariant S. For given time-invariant S, the utility max-
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t γ otherwise
Note that the constraints can be made stationary by redefining the problem in terms of
normalized bequests ẽit =
eit
wst
and normalized end-of-life wealth m̃it =
mit
wst
.8 In addition, it
is easy to see that the entire problem is stationary in ẽit−1 if and only if u() and v() are
identical quadratic functions and the limited-liability constraint is linear. This consideration
8 Alternatively, it is possible to normalize by wut or γ
t, with equivalent results.
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motivates the following assumption.
Assumption 2. u(x) = v(x) = x
1−σ




t,ss for θ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, the agent can pledge only a fraction θ of future earnings against a loan, so that
the parameter θ measures the degree of imperfection in the credit market (with high θ
corresponding to lower frictions), and can be thought of as an index of the financial devel-
opment of the economy. The parameter σ measures the elasticity of substitution between
own consumption and offspring’s wealth.
Expressed in terms of normalized bequests, the utility maximization problem for time-





























































ẽit(1 + r) +
γ
η̄ otherwise
I call this problem the normalized utility maximization problem. It is quite straight-
forward to see that lemmas 1, 2 and 3 apply here as well: wealthier parents leave larger
normalized bequests (i.e. the optimal ẽit increases with ẽit−1), and the probability of having
a skilled child increases with the efficiency of the educational technology and the credit
market (i.e. decreases with λ and θ). Instead, other parameters have an ambiguous effect
on the normalized utility maximization problem. For example, an increase in γ makes the
return on both professions higher, relaxes the credit constraint, and reduces the value of
bequests received by a parent. There is no presumption that for every possible ẽt−1 and βti
the overall effect is positive.9
More interestingly, changes in the skill premium η̄ affect skilled and unskilled parents
differently. In the normalized utility maximization problem, the benefit of having a skilled
9 This result is related to Rigolini (2004), who finds an ambiguous effect of hicksian growth rate on
inequality. In a model where there is no credit market, he shows that an increase in future wages can either
lead to a higher investment in education or a higher consumption, depending on the parameters of the utility
function.
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child is independent on the profession of the parent, but the cost of having a skilled child
depends on the parent’s profession. For given skill premium η̄, in case the return on the
two professions is unequal the cost of having a skilled child is greater for an unskilled parent
than for a skilled parent even when both parents have the same level of initial wealth (but
different wages). In addition, the cost of having a skilled child is decreasing in initial wealth
ẽit−1, which also tends to depress the incentive for unskilled parents to have skilled children.
More importantly, the transition probability between professions depends on the steady-
state skill premium η̄. For skilled parents, a higher η̄ increases the chances to have a skilled
child because it increases the benefit of a child’s education leaving unchanged the costs. The
reason is that a higher η̄ increases the cost of education but also the relative wage of a skilled
parent, who is therefore better able to provide a large bequest to her child. For an unskilled
parent, instead, the effect is ambiguous. The benefit of having a skilled child increases, but
the relative wage of an unskilled parent decreases. Hence, the cost of a child’s education as
measured by the marginal benefit of consuming instead of leaving bequests increases with
η̄.
It is easy to see that the evolution of normalized bequests for given η̄ is a Markov process,
because the normalized bequests left in every period depend only on the starting normalized
bequests and on the realization of βit . Furthermore, for given η̄, the skill bias
a
b has no impact
on the evolution of normalized bequests, which implies the following proposition.
Lemma 4. Assume that there is a finite upper bound to the level of normalized bequests that
can be accumulated. For every η̄ there exist a unique stationary distribution of normalized
bequests. We call its CDF F̃ (ẽ, η̄).
First of all, note that the above lemma is true only if the distribution of normalized be-
quests has an exogenously given upper bound. This assumption is made for technical reasons
and will be maintained throughout the paper, but should not be considered as restrictive
because this upper bound can be arbitrarily high. Note also that, because the steady state
distribution of normalized bequests is stationary, then the distribution of bequests grows at
the same rate as the skilled wage.
Characterization of the steady state After establishing that for every time-invariant S
(and η) there is a unique stationary distribution of normalized wealth, I can now characterize
the steady state of the economy. The following lemma derives necessary conditions for equal
and unequal steady states to exist.
Lemma 5. In an equal steady state, the following condition must hold:(
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In an unequal steady state, the following conditions must hold:(




θ > 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
. (21)
Proof. Immediate from the definition of equal and unequal steady states, 5, 6, 12, and using
the fact that, in steady state, wst−1,ssγ = wst,ss.
When condition 19 holds, the steady-state return on the skilled profession is equal to
the steady-state return on the unskilled profession. Instead, when condition 20 holds, the
steady-state return on the skilled profession is strictly greater than the steady-state return
on the unskilled profession. In this case, there can be a steady state only if condition 21
also holds, because under this condition credit market frictions are sufficiently severe and
an agent born with zero wealth cannot access education.





i.e. the Hicks-neutral growth rate is sufficiently high, the efficiency of the educational
technology is high (low λ), the interest rate is low, and credit market frictions are low (high
θ).
The above remark follows directly from condition 21. If the growth rate is high, then
the credit market works perfectly, and everybody is able to access education. The reason
is that future wages are very high (relative to current wages) and can be used as collateral
for borrowing. Similarly, γ, r and θ determine whether credit rationing is possible in steady
state, and hence whether inequality is possible. Therefore, γ, λ, r and θ are first-order
determinants of steady-state inequality, because they determine whether inequality can exist.
As we will see, skill bias a/b is a second order determinant, because it plays a role only if
condition 21 is satisfied.
In order to fully characterize the steady state of the economy, I need to find a time-
invariant measure of skilled agents S (and a time-invariant skill premium η) generating a
wealth distribution such that the number of skilled agent is S.
Proposition 2. Define






























, then there exists an unequal steady state {Sss, Uss}, with














































there exists an equal steady state {Sss, Uss}, with














The above proposition shows that the existence of a steady state as well as the number
of steady states of the economy depends on the number of solutions to Equation 22. Fur-
thermore, the value of the solutions to 22 determines whether this steady state is equal or
unequal, and, if the steady state is unequal, the steady-state skill premium. Finally, note
that whenever Equation 22 has multiple solutions and multiple steady states exist, these
steady states will be locally unique. See Figure 2 for an illustration of the possible cases.
Call pr {s→ u} the probability that a skilled parent has an unskilled child, and call
pr {u→ s} the probability that an unskilled parent has a skilled child. Suppose that η̂ >(
1− λ(1+r)γ
)−1
, so that all agents who can become skilled do so. Because the steady state














































) = pr {s→ u}
pr {u→ s}
.

































































































(e) No steady state.
Fig. 2: Equation 22 determines the existence, uniqueness, and the type of steady state.
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and we can study the existence, uniqueness and the type of steady state in the economy by
looking at the ratio of the transition probabilities across professions. In particular, we know
that pr {s→ u} decreases monotonically and goes to zero as η̄ increases (i.e. the probability
that a skilled parent has an unskilled child decreases monotonically to zero with η̄). However,
we do not know how pr {u→ s} changes with η̄, because for an unskilled parent, η̄ increases
both the costs and the return on her child’s education. Whenever pr {u→ s} decreases with
η̄, the expectation of a higher skill premium (higher η̄) may lead to fewer skilled workers
in the economy, creating a positive feedback that may generate multiple equilibria. On the
other hand, whenever pr {u→ s} increases with η̄, the expectation of a higher skill premium
always leads to an increase in the number of skilled workers, and a unique steady state
always exists. More formally, whenever pr {u→ s} increases with η̄, the LHS of Equation
22 decreases monotonically to zero, and the economy has a unique steady state. This steady
state can be either equal or unequal, corresponding to either panel (a) or (b) of Figure 2.
Remark 2. For ε→ 1, there exists a unique steady state.
Remember that when ε = 1 the two types of labor enter linearly into the production
function. For ε approximately close to 1, the LHS of equation 22 is approximately an
horizontal straight line, and a steady state (either equal or unequal) always exists.
Comparative statics. Because the steady states are generically unique, it is possible to
perform some comparative statics exercises. I choose to focus on equilibria in which the
LHS of equation 22 crosses the RHS of equation 22 from above, because this is how the two
curves cross whenever ε → 1 (see the previous remark). Of course, all comparative statics
are reversed if we consider equilibria in which the LHS of equation 22 crosses the RHS of
equation 22 from below.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the LHS of equation 22 crosses the RHS of equation 22 from
above (which is the case whenever ε→ 1). In case the steady state of the economy is unequal,
the steady state skill premium increases with the skill bias a/b.
This corollary follows by simple inspection of Equation 22. Therefore, despite the fact
that the supply of skilled workers reacts to the skill premium, a higher skill bias leads to
more inequality in the long run. The key observation is that the supply of skilled workers
from skilled parents behaves very differently from the supply of skilled workers from un-
skilled parents. As a/b increases, a skilled worker becomes relative more likely to have a
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skilled parent rather than an unskilled parent. Hence, an increase in the skill bias simulta-
neously decreases social mobility and increases the return on the skilled profession, causing
an increase in inequality. Finally, note that the skill bias has an effect on the steady state
skill premium only if the economy is already unequal. The reason is that, in an equal steady





Hence, an increase in the degree of technological skill bias should lead to an increase in
inequality (as measured by the skill premium) if and only if the economy is unequal to start
with. Otherwise, the skill bias will not change. This consideration is relevant because it
implies that there is a connection between the initial degree of inequality and the increase
in inequality due to skill biased technological change.
Lemma 6. Suppose that the LHS of equation 22 crosses the RHS of equation 22 from above
(which is the case whenever ε→ 1). Furthermore, suppose the steady state of the economy is
unequal. The steady-state skill premium decreases with θ and increases with λ. Furthermore,
the impact of a given change in θ on the steady-state skill premium is increasing in ab .
As already discussed, inequality exists because it is easier for a skilled parent than for
an unskilled parent to have a skilled child. As the above lemma shows, this same logic
implies that when the educational technology is inefficient or credit market frictions are
large inequality (as measured by the skill premium) will be greater. Finally, the effect
of improving the efficiency of the credit market on long-run inequality will be larger in
economies with high skill bias than on those with low skill bias.
4 Conclusion
The main message of the model is that the unbiased rate of technological progress is much
more important for long-run inequality than the degree of technological skill bias. This re-
sult is actually the opposite of what happens in the short-run, when the supply of skilled and
unskilled workers is fixed. In the short run, a change in the rate of unbiased technological
progress affects the earnings of all workers in the same way, leaving inequality unchanged,
while an episode of skill-biased technological change increases inequality. In the long run,
unbiased technological progress affects the credit market while skill bias does not, which
makes unbiased technological progress much more relevant for the existence of inequality.
The model also allows for the study of how the different determinants of long-run inequality
interact with each other. I show that an increase in the efficiency of the educational technol-
ogy or an improvement in the functioning of the credit market decrease long-run inequality.
The latter effect is stronger the higher the degree of technological skill bias in the economy.
The main result of the model is Lemma 5 and, more precisely, remark 1. This result
depends exclusively on the workings of the credit market in steady state, i.e. whether
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someone born with zero wealth can borrow from a zero-profits risk-neutral bank. It is
therefore robust to, for example, other types of utility functions, forms of altruisms, or the
introduction of innate ability. Finally, whether technological skill bias should be seen as
endogenous or exogenous depends on whether the economy is a large advanced country that
produces its own technology, or rather a country that imports technology. In the body of
the paper, I implicitly assumed that technology is not produced endogenously but rather
imported from abroad. In Appendix A I show that, as long as the elasticity of the skill
bias to the skill composition is not too high, all results presented in the body of the paper
continue to hold, with the exception of those relative to how inequality depends on the skill
bias.
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A Appendix: endogenous skill bias
Several authors argued that the degree of technological skill bias is endogenous. For exam-
ple, Acemoglu (1998) assumes that technological change is directed, in the sense that the
technological skill bias is a function of the skill composition of the economy. He identifies
two effects: a price effect which encourages the development of technologies complementing
the most expensive input, and a market size effect which encourages the development of
technologies complementing the input with the largest market. The combination of the two
effects imply that the technological skill bias can be an increasing or a decreasing function
of the ratio of skilled-to-unskilled agents in the economy.
The model can easily accommodate the case of endogenous skill bias. For the sake of
simplicity, I do not model here the process by which the skill composition determines the
skill bias, but simply assume that the steady state skill bias is a function of the steady state


































As long as the skill bias is taken as given by agents and firms, we can follow the same
steps already described. It is quite immediate to see that Lemma 5 and Remark 1 hold here





Hence, also here, the Hicks-neutral growth rate is a first order determinant of the existence
of long run inequality, because when it is sufficiently large everybody has access to the credit
market and no inequality is possible.
Following the same steps described above, it is possible to characterize the unique time-
invariant wealth distribution for given time-invariant skill premium η̄. After that, it is
possible to look for the time-invariant skill premium η̄ generating a wealth distribution and
a number of skilled and unskilled agents that is consistent with the starting time-invariant
skill premium η̄, as expressed in equation 22. The only difference is that, here ab depends
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Leading the the following corollary, which is an adaptation of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. Define































, then there exists an unequal steady state {Sss, Uss}, with
Uss = 1− Sss,















































there exists an equal steady state {Sss, Uss}, with
Uss = 1− Sss,











The difference between this model and the model discussed in the body of the paper are
evident by comparing the RHS of equation (23) with the RHS of equation (22). First of
all, with exogenous skill bias, a unique steady state exists whenever ε→ 1. This is not true
anymore when skill bias is endogenous. Due to the interaction of price effect and market
size effect, the RHS of equation (23) does not have to be monotonic or display any type of
regularity.
However, it is quite evident that if the function ν() is sufficiently inelastic, then the LHS
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of equation (23) is sufficiently close to a straight line, and the results derived in the main
text applies here as well: when ε → 1 there is a unique steady state in which the LHS of
equation (23) crosses its RHS from above. Hence, if ν() is sufficiently inelastic, then Lemma
6 applies here as well.
Overall, with endogenous skill bias, when the Hicks-neutral growth rate is high enough,
no long-run inequality is possible. Furthermore, when the elasticity of the skill bias to the
skill composition of the economy is sufficiently low, the steady state comparative statics
with respect to λ and θ derived in the body of the paper continue to apply here as well.
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Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. At the beginning of period t − 1, the state of the economy is given by the wealth
distribution Ft−1(e) and the number of teachers λ2St−1. In turn, λ2St−1 is sufficient to
determine the equilibrium wages in period t− 1 and the cost of education λwst−1.
In order to show that a competitive equilibrium exists, I need to show that there exists
a St with Ut = 1− St such that either

















First of all, note that the returns on the two professions change continuously and mono-
tonically with St. It follows that, for St sufficiently low equation 24 holds (think of St = 0),
for St sufficiently high equation 24 is violated (think of St = 1, so that there are no unskilled
workers in the economy), and there is a unique value of St at which 26 holds.
Call S′t the value of St such that 26 holds. If condition 27 holds at S′t, then S′t is the
unique equilibrium St, where uniqueness follows from the fact that any other St < S′t would
necessary violate 25 and any other St > S′t would necessary violate 24.
Suppose instead that condition 27 is violated at S′t. Note that any St < S′t satisfies
condition 24. To find an equilibrium, we need to find a St < S′t that satisfies equation 25.




1+r increases continuously with St, and Ut decreases
continuously with St. Hence, if Ft−1(e) is continuous, then there exists a unique St such
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that equation 25 is satisfied. If the distribution Ft−1(e) is instead discontinuous, the supply
of unskilled workers will change discontinuously at some value of St = S′′t whenever there is
a positive mass of agents with wealth equal to:
e′′ = λwst−1 −
(wst (S
′′
t , 1− S′′t )− τ (wst (S′′t , 1− S′′t )))
1 + r
When this is the case, for any St < S′′t the number of agents without access to credit is
U, but at St = S′′t this number jumps discontinuously at U ′′t > U . However, note that at
S′′t banks are indifferent between lending to agents with wealth e′′ or not. We can assume
that the banking sector lends to any arbitrary fraction of agents with wealth equal to e′′.
Exploiting this indifference, when St = S′′t the supply of unskilled workers can take any
value between U and U ′′. Also in this case, there is a unique St such that equation 25 is
satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. The lemma follows from Theorem 2 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992). The existence
of the stationary distribution is guaranteed by the fact that the transition function describing
the Markov process is increasing. Consider two households with initial normalized bequests
level ẽ1t−1 and ẽ2t−1 with ẽ1t−1 ≥ ẽ2t−1. Assuming that the altruism parameter βi is the same
between these two households, then by lemma 1 for every βi we have ẽ1t ≥ ẽ2t . This implies
that the normalized wealth distribution in period t is increasing (in a stochastic dominance
sense) in the level of normalized wealth in period t−1. The uniqueness of the the stationary
distribution is guaranteed by the fact that the Markov process satisfies the Monotone Mixing
Condition (MMC), i.e. there exists a level of normalized bequests ẽ? and an integer m > 0,
such that:
• starting from the largest possible level of normalized bequests (the upper bound to the
level of normalized bequests that can be accumulated), there is a positive probability
of falling below ẽ? in m periods. This is always true for any ẽ? and m because if the
altruism parameter is sufficiently low a parent will leave no bequest.
• starting form the zero wealth, there is a positive probability of being above ẽ? in m
periods. Again, if ẽ? is sufficiently low, this is true for any m because sufficiently
altruistic parent will leave positive bequests.
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Proof of Proposition 2.











Assuming that all agents who can access education become skilled types, we can characterize






































the return on the skilled profession is greater than the
return on the unskilled profession, and all agents who can access education will access
education. Hence, η̂ is the steady-state skill premium corresponding to an unequal steady




, the return on the skilled profession is lower than the
return on the skilled profession at η̂, nobody will want to access education, and an unequal
steady state cannot exist.
























1−ε < (1− λ(1 + r)
γ
)−1






































1−ε = (1− λ(1 + r)
γ
)−1
where φ is the fraction of agents with access to the credit market who remain unskilled,
























1−ε > (1− λ(1 + r)
γ
)−1
no equal steady state can exist.
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Proof of Proposition 6.

























By the implicit function theorem, whenever there is an increase in λ (i.e. a decrease in the











































































As discussed in the text, here I’m considering steady states in which the LHS of equation
















Furthermore, because of Lemma 3, everything else equal the probability of becoming a skilled



















∂λ > 0. Therefore the steady-state
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Furthermore, this effect is stronger the larger is the skill bias ab .
